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Abstract
Leaders often have to weigh ethical against monetary consequences. Such situations may
evoke psychological costs from being dishonest and dismissing higher monetary benefits for
others. In a within-subjects experiment, we analyze such a dilemma. We first measure indi-
vidual dishonest behavior when subjects report the outcome of a die roll, which determines
their payoffs. Subsequently, they act as leaders and report payoffs for a group including
themselves. In our main treatment, subjects can apply for leadership, whereas in the control
treatment, we assign leadership randomly. Results reveal that women behave more dishon-
estly as leaders while men behave similarly in both the individual and the group decision.
For female leaders, we find that sorting into leadership is not related to individual honesty
preferences. In the control we find that female leaders do not increase dishonesty. A follow-
up study reveals that female leaders become more dishonest after assuming leadership, as
they align dishonest behavior with their belief on group members’ honesty preferences.
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1 Introduction
Leadership behavior and selection into leadership positions play a key role for the performance
of teams in firms, sport teams, or political parties (Peterson et al., 2012; Lorinkova et al., 2013;
Bandiera et al., 2020). Although evidence suggests that a higher share of women is beneficial for a
company’s performance, women are still largely underrepresented in leadership positions (Flabbi
et al., 2019; Zenger and Folkman, 2019). Besides historical gender-role attitudes (Alesina et al.,
2013), gender differences in preferences (Croson and Gneezy, 2009) are a potential explanation
for why women partly sort out. That is, they lack risk tolerance, confidence, or competitive
preferences, as compared to men (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2001; Eckel and Grossman, 2002;
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Ertac and Gurdal, 2012; Alan and Ertac, 2019; Alan et al., 2020).
Moreover, women have been shown to be less dishonest than men in selfish-black-lie situations
(e.g., Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Grosch and Rau, 2017). Since leadership decisions may
require that they bend rules at times when there are social, monetary, or other incentives in
place, differences in dishonest behavior may be another piece of the puzzle explaining gender
differences in leadership sorting and behavior.
There are two key motivations for behaving dishonestly as a leader. First, leaders benefit
personally since they are typically compensated and promoted based on their performance.
Thus, leaders have an incentive to misreport outcomes, particularly to the entities relevant for
their performance evaluation (Burns and Kedia, 2006). Second, leaders’ decisions impact the
payoffs of different stakeholders, e.g., shareholders in the case of managers or a politician’s staff
members (Berman et al., 1999). Since a leader is, at least partially, evaluated based on the
satisfaction of the stakeholders’ needs and aspirations, his or her decisions are shaped by the
beliefs about stakeholders’ preferences. Moreover, the payoff externalities of leadership decisions
highlight the potential role of social preferences or norms for decision-making.
In this paper, we study how people’s dishonest behavior is affected by leadership, i.e., when
they decide as leaders who are assuming responsibility for a group. Moreover, we investigate
whether the decision to become a leader is motivated by individual honesty preferences. Analyz-
ing gender differences in the willingness to become a leader contributes to a better understanding
of selection effects into leadership roles. In this respect, we can analyze whether the gender gap
in executive positions may be related to gender differences in dishonesty.
To study dishonest behavior, we conducted an experiment where subjects repeatedly re-
port outcomes of a die roll that determines payoffs. This method is known as the die-rolling
game by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Here, participants roll a die and receive a payoff
that increases in the reported outcome. Although the experiment is stylized, it encompasses
characteristics which may model dishonest behavior in business situations.1 For instance, the
reporting set-up resembles situations in which managers know the real outcome and may inten-
tionally misreport to increase company returns (e.g., Burns and Kedia, 2006; Bollen and Pool,
1See Abeler et al. (2019) for a meta-study analysis on dishonest behavior.
1
2009), the sale figures of teams (Church et al., 2012), or wrong figures to evade taxes (Joulfaian,
2000). All these dishonest actions have in common that there is a low chance of getting caught
and punished. The real-life implications of the die-rolling game has been demonstrated in the
fields of corrupt behavior (Hanna and Wang, 2017), free riding in public transportation (Potters
and Stoop, 2016), and refraining from reporting over-payments (Dai et al., 2018).
In our within-subjects experiment, participants report the outcome of a die roll twice. First,
subjects only report for themselves, which serves as a proxy for individual honesty preferences.
Subsequently, we measure dishonest behavior when assuming responsibility for a group. That
is, they report the outcome of a die roll as group leaders, which determines their payoff and the
payoff of two group members. Before they make this decision, we analyze subjects’ willingness
to take up leadership by asking them whether they want to become a leader or not. They
know that if more than one person says “yes,” a random draw will select one of the applicants.2
Measuring leadership preferences allows us two things. First, we can study whether individual
honesty preferences affect the decision to become leaders. Second, we can analyze whether the
willingness to take up leadership affects dishonest behavior for groups. To isolate the effects of
endogenous leadership, we ran a control treatment without the possibility to apply for leadership.
The results demonstrate that women behave less dishonestly than men when deciding on
individual payoffs. This gender difference vanishes when subjects make their second reporting
decision in the role of a group leader. This can be explained by women increasing dishonest
behavior as leaders, particularly those who have a willingness to act as a leader. We find that
men with a preference for dishonesty self-select into leadership and show similar misreporting
behavior in the group domain as in the individual domain. By contrast, women’s willingness to
take over leadership is not related to their individual honesty preferences. Our control treatment
highlights that women only increase dishonest behavior for groups when they could apply for
leadership, but not when there was an external appointment. The results demonstrate that
women’s increase in dishonesty is not driven by the group context per se. It is spurred by a
combination of the explicit decision to act as a leader and to decide on behalf of others.
To further investigate the underlying mechanisms of women increasing dishonest behavior
as a leader of a group, we conducted a second study that is similar to the first study. Here, we
additionally elicit leaders’ beliefs on the honesty preferences of group members. We interpret
this measure as the leader’s perceived group norm. The study also controls for subjects’ social
value orientation to account for a possible relation between prosociality and misreporting for
groups. Perceived norms seem to be the key driver for female leaders to increase misreporting
for groups; particularly for women who applied for leadership. By contrast, for women who did
not apply for leadership, social value orientation explains their preference for being dishonest to
support the group.
Our study sheds light on the scarce experimental evidence on gender differences in leadership
2If no person applies, one of all three group members is randomly selected.
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behavior. We highlight that women alter their behavior when they act as leaders and applied for
a position while men do not. Moreover, we contribute to a better understanding of the lack of
female leaders. There are many explanations for why women are underrepresented in leadership
positions. Some of these are worse overall evaluations of women with similar performance than
men (Boring, 2017; Mengel et al., 2019; Özgümüs et al., 2020),3 fewer promotions of high-
qualified women compared to men (Bohnet et al., 2016), and less appreciation of female leaders
by employees (Grossman et al., 2019). Our experiment adds to this literature by analyzing the
relation of honesty preferences on the decision to become a leader. Our data analysis suggests
that women’s general aversion to behaving dishonestly cannot explain their hesitance to apply
and take up leadership positions. Moreover, we provide evidence of whether men and women
show behavioral changes when promoted to leadership. This may help to better anticipate
the impact of personnel decisions on management success. The behavioral change of women’s
honesty when promoted to leaders, suggests for women’s quota in executive positions that it
may not lead to more ethical leaders.
2 Study 1: Experimental Design
In this section, we describe the design of our within-subjects experiment. At the beginning of
the experiment, we elicit subjects’ preferences (risk preferences, inequality aversion, competition
preferences, and ambiguity preferences) in separate parts with incentives to account for individ-
ual heterogeneity.4 They are told that at the end of the session, the computer would randomly
select one of the parts for payoff. Afterward, we apply modifications of the die-rolling game in-
troduced by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) to measure dishonest behavior when deciding
onx individual payoffs (“individual preferences for honesty”) and group payoffs (“preferences for
honesty in groups”). For each part, subjects receive new instructions and we inform them step
by step about the subsequent part. In the following, we describe briefly the preference elicita-
tion parts (detailed instructions of the elicitation parts can be found in Appendix B). Then, we
present the two die-rolling games. At the end of each session, we apply a questionnaire with
socio-demographic questions.
2.1 Elicitation of Individual Preferences
In part one, we measure individual risk preferences based on the method by Eckel and Grossman
(2002). Subjects choose one out of six lotteries. The risky nature of the chosen lottery determines
subjects’ risk tolerance. Afterward, we measure subjects’ inequality aversion parameters of the
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model with the method of Blanco et al. (2011). That is, in part two,
we elicit subjects’ aversion to advantageous inequality (β) and, in part three, we measure their
3Card et al. (2020) study the role of gender in the evaluation of economic papers. Although, they find that
female authors even are more often cited than male authors, their papers are not more often accepted.
4We also use these data in another research project on elicitation methods of preferences (Grosch et al., 2020).
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aversion to disadvantageous inequality (α). Here, subjects are shown choice sets with varying
money allocations between themselves and another participant. Their choices in these tasks
determine their inequality-aversion parameters. Competitive preferences are measured with the
design of Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) in parts four to six. In part four, subjects work in
a real-effort task and are paid by a piece rate whereas in part five the remuneration of the
task is based on the outcome of a tournament. In part six, subjects have to decide whether
to compete in a tournament or to work individually on the task and be paid by piece rate.
The decision classifies subjects as competitive or not. In part seven, we measure ambiguity
preferences applying a multiple-price-list design by Gneezy et al. (2015). Subjects are presented
with pairs of risky gambles with constant payoffs and ambiguous gambles with increasing payoffs.
Subjects who switch earlier (later) from the risky to the ambiguous gamble are classified by lower
(higher) ambiguity preferences.
2.2 Individual Preferences for Honesty
To get an idea on individual honesty preferences, in this part we measure subjects’ general
misreporting as a benchmark. This is an essential part of our within-subjects experiment as it
enables us to compare honesty preferences when subjects decide for themselves to the situation,
where they can misreport for groups. To measure honesty preferences, we implement a version of
the method by Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Here, subjects have to report the outcome
of a die-roll. To have control over individual misreporting behavior, we apply a computerized
version of the die-rolling game that records the real die outcome. This approach is similar to
Kocher et al. (2017). Here, subjects cannot disguise their lies and, therefore, we expect subjects
to be less dishonest than in the original die-rolling game (Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017). To
demonstrate to subjects that the die is fair, they can repeatedly press a button for 20 seconds
that randomly shows one side of a six-sided die whenever they press the button. At the end
of the 20 seconds, subjects are informed that they should press the button one more time and
report the outcome of the actual die roll. They know that the report determines their payment
in this task. The payment of each report corresponds to the reported number times three. For
instance, a one yields e3, a two yields e6, .., a five yields e15. The only exception is the number
six that yields no payment so as to mitigate the risk of introducing a focal point (Fischbacher
and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013).
2.3 Preferences for Honesty in Groups
In this part, we play a die-rolling game similar to the previous one. That is, subjects again roll
a six-sided die and report the outcome. We apply the same payoff structure as in the previous
part (e.g., reporting a four yields a payoff of e12). This time, we refrain from the 20-second
trial phase. The crucial difference is that subjects learn that they have been randomly matched
in groups of three. They are told that the payoff of each group member is determined by the
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report made by a group leader. It is made clear that each of the other group members receives
the same payoff as the one reported by the leader. We do not use the word “leader” in the
instructions. Instead, we call the person who determines the group payoff: “Person A.” Before
subjects roll the die, they can choose whether they want to be in the role of “person A” (leader)
or not. When only one person states a willingness to become the leader, she becomes the leader.
When more than one person says “yes,” a random draw selects one of the persons who applied
for leadership. When no one applies, the random draw selects one person among the three
group members. The choice mechanism enables us to relate the subjects’ individual honesty
preferences to their willingness to act as a leader. Moreover, we can analyze whether a subject’s
choice to assume responsibility has an effect on dishonest behavior when reporting group payoffs.
After subjects decide whether they want to act as a leader or not, we elicit their beliefs about
how many of the other group members wanted to become the leader. Subjects receive e1 for a
correct guess. In a next step, we apply the strategy method (Selten, 1967) to measure subjects’
misreporting behavior when deciding for the group payoffs. Here, all subjects are told to roll
the die once and report the payoff when they become a person A (leader). They know that this
decision only becomes relevant if they are selected as the leader. That procedure allows us to
compare the honesty preferences of all subjects, independent of whether they want to become
leaders or not. Subjects are told the anonymous id (subject 1, 2, or 3) of the selected leader and
they are informed of the report made by this subject at the end of the experiment. However,
they are not informed of the real die outcome of this subject. We illustrate the sequence of
actions in Figure 1.
Figure 1: sequence of actions
Our experimental design models the hierarchical decisions of leaders. That is, subjects report
in the role of leaders in a non-strategic situation the payoffs for the group. In contrast, Kocher
et al. (2017) also analyze honesty in decisions for groups, but in their experiment decision-making
is strategic, as group payoffs increase when group members coordinate. That is, subjects only
earn a positive amount if they report the same die outcome as the other group members.5
Another difference is that our subjects decide independently of others, whereas subjects in
Kocher et al. (2017) meet in a chat before they make their reporting decisions. We deliberately
refrain from a strategic group context to avoid confounds for answering our research question
5In a control treatment, they also analyze simultaneous group decisions of reporting individual payoffs when
subjects do not have to achieve commonality.
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on leaders’ decision to report payoffs on behalf of their teams.
To disentangle the effects of the endogenous leadership on dishonest behavior, we run a
control treatment with a random external appointment of leaders without group members having
the possibility to apply. To account for the possibility that subjects in our main treatment may
hold different beliefs on the likelihood of ending up as a leader, we apply different probabilities
of becoming a leader in the exogenous treatment. The probabilities vary between one third, i.e.,
we tell all three group members that their probability of becoming a leader is one third, and a
half, i.e., we tell one group member that she cannot become a leader for sure, while the other
two group-members are told that the probability of becoming a leader is one half.6 With the
exception of the exogenous leader choice, where subjects are told the probabilities of becoming
a leader, everything else is similar in the control treatment as compared to the main treatment.
2.4 Procedure
The experiment was conducted at a German university and it was programmed with the soft-
ware z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited with the subject-pool software ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015). In total, 282 subjects participated in the experiments (144 in the main treat-
ment; 138 in the control treatment). After subjects made their decisions, we ran a questionnaire
to verbally elicit their preferences. This is part of another project on the relation of non-
incentivized and incentivized preferences (Grosch et al., 2020). To control for order effects we
conducted some sessions with the questionnaire at the beginning. At the very end of the ex-
periment, we asked for subjects’ socio-demographics. Participants were from various disciplines
with a mean age of 23.60. In our sample we find that 50.4% of the subjects were female. Sessions
lasted approximately 70 minutes. Subjects were paid in cash at the end of the experiment and
earned an average of e10.81, including a show-up fee of e5. In the following, we start reporting
the hypotheses and results of our main study (study 1).
3 Study 1: Hypotheses
In our analysis of honesty preferences we focus on the cases when subjects misreport payoffs.
Therefore, we will use the term “dishonest behavior.” The experimental literature on gender
differences in individual misreporting behavior finds predominantly that men behave more dis-
honestly than women for selfish black lies, i.e., when being dishonest benefits oneself and harms
another person/third party in the lab (Dreber and Johannesson, 2008; Houser et al., 2012; Con-
rads et al., 2014; Grosch and Rau, 2017) and in the field (Azar et al., 2013; Bucciol et al., 2013).
This derives our first hypothesis on individual reporting behavior.
6We do not have groups in which only one group member could become the leader for sure as this is a very
rare case in the endogenous treatment. This only applies for five of 144 cases.
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Hypothesis 1:
Men behave significantly more dishonestly than women when deciding for themselves.
Misreporting for the group generates a benefit for the team members and can therefore be seen
as a Pareto improvement over telling the truth. Thus, subjects may receive an extra utility
from dishonest behavior for the group than when deciding for themselves. In line with that,
Gino et al. (2013) demonstrate that the more other people benefit from misreporting, the more
people are willing to be dishonest. Hence, we expect that subjects are more likely to misreport
for groups as compared to deciding for individual payoffs.
Women have been found, on average, to be more prosocial than men (e.g., Eckel and Gross-
man, 1998; Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Rand et al., 2016). They
are also expected to demonstrate higher prosociality at work compared to men (Brañas-Garza
et al., 2018). When they do not follow this stereotypical expectation, they are evaluated more
negatively than men with similar prosocial behavior (Heilman and Chen, 2005). Deciding to
be dishonest for the group could be perceived as an act of being prosocial. In this case, there
are two reasons why women may show a more pronounced increase of dishonest behavior for
the group than men. First, they are expected to misreport when making decisions concerning
others’ payoffs and, second, they have more pronounced prosocial preferences than men.
Hypothesis 2:
(a) Subjects increase dishonest behavior when reporting payoffs for a group compared to reporting
payoffs for themselves only.
(b) The increase in dishonest behavior for a group is more pronounced for women than for men.
People select into leadership positions based on characteristics such as risk preferences, over-
confidence, or competitive preferences depending on the requirements of the leadership position
(e.g., Barber and Odean, 2001; Eckel and Grossman, 2002; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Ertac
and Gurdal, 2012). For example, if a leadership position requires risky decisions to be made on
behalf of a group, risk-loving people rather than risk-averse ones self-select into the leadership
position (Ertac and Gurdal, 2012). Our setting resembles a decision context with potential gains
from misreporting. Therefore, we expect that subjects’ individual honesty preferences determine
self-selection into the leadership role.
Hypothesis 3:
Subjects who behave dishonestly for themselves are more likely to apply for the leadership position.
In our design, when subjects state that they want to become a leader, they deliberately
express their willingness to assume responsibility. The literature on endogenous institutions
emphasizes that subjects are more willing to stick to a certain behavior after they have deliber-
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ately voted for institutions. More precisely, subjects contribute more in public-good games after
they have voted for a punishment institution that intends to prevent free riding (Kosfeld et al.,
2009; Sutter et al., 2010). Moreover, there is evidence that leaders who volunteered as leaders
contribute more to a public good than leaders who are exogenously appointed (Haigner and
Wakolbinger, 2010; Rivas and Sutter, 2011). Based on this literature, we expect in our set-up
that leaders who volunteered to become a leader are more willing to misreport for the group
than subjects who did not apply for leadership. There may be subjects who behave honestly
in individual decisions. It is possible that these subjects may behave similarly in the group do-
main. However, we do not believe that being an honest person motivates subjects to become a
leader in general. When an honest subject does not become a leader and another leader behaves
dishonestly, the subject would not be responsible for this decision. In contrast, there are strong
monetary incentives for becoming a leader and to misreport in the group domain for dishonest
subjects.
Hypothesis 4:
The increase in misreporting for groups is driven by dishonest subjects who applied for leadership.
4 Study 1: Results
In this section, we present our main results on dishonest behavior when subjects only reported
individual payoffs and when they reported group payoffs. We start with our main results on
endogenous leadership decisions. When applying non-parametric tests, we always report two-
sided p-values throughout.
4.1 Main results
Figure 2 focuses on subjects’ misreporting behavior in our main treatment, where subjects
can apply for leadership (endogenous leadership). We count all cases as “profitable dishonest
reports” when subjects increased their payoffs by misreporting the real outcome of the die-roll.
Then, the dummy variable “dishonest behavior” becomes one. Otherwise, this dummy variable
is zero.7 This encompasses die outcomes between one and four, where subjects inflated their
statements by reporting higher numbers between two and five, and when subjects rolled a six
and reported a lower number (between one and five).
We show the reporting decisions of individual payoffs using white bars and the reporting decisions
of group payoffs with black bars in Figure 2. The diagram conditions on men (left panel) and
women (right panel). When reporting individual payoffs, our data confirm commonly found
gender differences in dishonesty (e.g., Conrads et al., 2014; Grosch and Rau, 2017; Kocher et al.,
7The dummy variable is set to “0” when subjects reported the real outcome, or when they reported an outcome
that was to their disadvantage. However, we do not observe the latter case in study 1.
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Figure 2: Percentage of profitable dishonest reports in endogenous leadership. White (black) bars present
the reports for individual payoffs (group payoffs). Standard error bars included.
2017). That is, men are (26%) five times more frequently dishonest than women (5%) (Fisher’s
exact test, p=0.001).
We turn to our first research question and analyze the misreporting of the group leaders. It
can be seen that the gender difference in dishonesty disappears when subjects report group pay-
offs (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.353). In the group domain, women significantly increase dishonest
behavior by more than four times from 5% to 24% (Wilcoxon matched-pairs test, p<0.001).
By contrast, men show the same behavior in both contexts (individual payoffs: 26%; group
payoffs: 32%) (Wilcoxon matched-pairs test, p=0.346). In general, we find that subjects behave
more dishonestly when reporting group payoffs (28%) than individual payoffs (15%) (Wilcoxon
matched-pairs test, p=0.002). This is in line with the results from Kocher et al. (2017).
Table 1 demonstrates that our results are confirmed by random effects Probit regressions on
the likelihood of behaving dishonestly.
Model (1) includes a gender dummy (female), which is positive for women and group payoff,
a dummy which is positive when subjects make decisions affecting group payoffs. In model
(2) we interact female and group payoff. In model (3) we include control variables for risk
preferences, competition preferences, fairness (alpha and beta of the Fehr and Schmidt, 1999,
model), ambiguity preferences, age, and whether subjects study economics.8 Each subject makes
two reporting decisions (n = 288). The regressions are clustered at the subject level (n = 144).
We report average marginal effects (see Table 5 in Appendix A for the corresponding Probit
model).
In model (1), we find that female is highly significant with a negative sign. Thus, women
8As we elicited our preference measures with two different orders, we also included a dummy variable controlling
for the order.
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Table 1: Random effects Probit regressions on dishonest behavior in endogenous leadership.
dishonest behavior
(1) (2) (3)
female -0.140*** -0.266*** -0.183**
(0.052) (0.076) (0.078)
group payoff 0.126*** 0.046 0.047
(0.039) (0.048) (0.050)
female × group payoff 0.202** 0.200**
(0.082) (0.083)
controlsa no no yes
obs. 288 288 288
groups 144 144 144
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The regressions are clustered on the subject level (n =
144) and report average marginal effects.
a Controls: Risk preferences, competition preferences, fair-
ness, ambiguity preferences, age, whether subjects study eco-
nomics, and an order dummy.
generally behave less dishonestly than men. We therefore confirm Hypothesis 1. Moreover,
group payoff is highly significant, i.e., subjects increase their dishonest behavior when being
responsible for the payoffs of group members. Thus, we support Hypothesis 2a. Model (2)
highlights that the increase in dishonest behavior for groups is entirely driven by women. When
controlling for the interaction effect of female × group payoff, the coefficient of group payoff
becomes insignificant. At the same time, the interaction is significant and positive. Thus, the
interaction effect offsets the negative coefficient of female which confirms the absence of gender
differences when deciding for the group. Model (3) shows that the finding is robust to the
inclusion of control variables.9 The findings of models (2) and (3) confirm Hypothesis 2b. We
summarize our findings.
Result 1: Dishonest Behavior for Individual and Group Payoffs
(a) Women behave less dishonestly than men when reporting individual payoffs.
(b) Women behave as dishonestly as men when acting as leaders.
9We find positive significant effects for risk tolerance and subjects studying economics. The order dummy is
insignificant.
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4.2 The Impact of Endogenous Leadership
In this section, we test Hypothesis 3 and 4 to better understand the influencing factors of
dishonest behavior for groups. For this, we focus on the impact of endogenous leadership. In
our endogenous leadership treatment, subjects can actively apply to become a leader and saying
“yes” increases the chance of ending up as a leader. Thus, this statement may work as a selection
device. This would imply that subjects who state that they want leadership might systematically
differ in their preferences from subjects who opted against it.
This idea follows our second research question and Hypothesis 3, which expects that indi-
vidual honesty preferences are a predictor for the willingness to become a leader. Interestingly,
it turns out that an insignificantly smaller share of women (71%) than men (80%) (Fisher’s
exact test, p=0.250) apply for leadership. Since women generally behave less dishonestly for
themselves, the rather high share of women suggests that women may have other reasons to
apply for leadership than honesty preferences.
To test Hypothesis 3 more thoroughly, we run Probit regressions (Table 2), analyzing the
determinants of subjects’ willingness to become a leader.
Table 2: Probit regressions on wanted leadership and dishonesty for groups (endog. leadership).
wanted leadership dishonesty for groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
female -0.057 -0.048 -0.061 0.049
(0.073) (0.076) (0.073) (0.078)
wanted leadership 0.196** 0.186**
(0.091) (0.087)
misreported for themselves 0.211* 0.329**
(0.122) (0.159)
female × misreported for themselves -0.306
(0.266)
controlsa no yes no yes
obs. 144 144 144 144
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The regressions report average marginal effects.
a Controls: Risk preferences, competition preferences, fairness, ambiguity
preferences, age, whether subjects study economics, and an order dummy.
In models (1)–(2), we test whether subjects who want to become leaders differ in their socio-
economics, which may be proxies for preferences influencing misreporting for the group. That
is, we can test whether individual honesty preferences predict the decision to become a leader.
Therefore, we include a dummy (misreported for themselves) that is positive when subjects
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behaved dishonestly when deciding on individual payoffs and zero otherwise. We also control
for subjects’ gender (female) and the interaction effect of gender and individual misreporting
(female × misreported for themselves). Model (2) includes the same set of controls as before.
The models report average marginal effects (see Table 6 in Appendix A for the corresponding
Probit model).
We find that the coefficient of misreported for themselves is significant, i.e., subjects who
behave dishonestly at the individual level are more likely to become leaders. Female is not
significant which confirms our finding of no gender differences in the willingness to become a
leader. A closer look at model (2) reveals that the positive effect of honesty preferences is
entirely driven by men. That is, misreported for themselves is only significant for men but not
for women (Wald test, p=0.915). Thus, selection effects are obviously only in place for men but
not for women, which supports Hypothesis 3 only for male leaders.
We turn to Hypothesis 4 to shed more light on the effects of endogenous leadership. We
test whether subjects’ deliberate decision to act as the leader may impact their behavior when
reporting the payoffs of groups. Models (3)–(4) present this analysis and focus on dishonesty for
groups. The models include a dummy variable (wanted leadership) that is positive when subjects
applied for leadership. The models use a gender dummy and the same controls as in model (2).
We find that subjects who applied for leadership are more likely to behave dishonestly when
deciding for group payoffs. This is demonstrated by the positive and significant coefficient of
wanted leadership. Model (4) highlights that among subjects who wanted to become leaders,
the probability of a dishonest report is higher by 19 percentage points.10 Thus, we support
Hypothesis 4. Wilcoxon matched-pairs tests show that the increase in dishonest behavior is
driven by women who applied for leadership. They significantly behave more dishonestly for
groups as compared to when they are deciding for themselves (p<0.001). By contrast, this is
not the case for men who want to become leaders (p=0.607). We summarize our findings.
Result 2: Determinants of Leadership and Consequences on Dishonesty in Groups
(a) Men who behave dishonestly for themselves are more likely to become leaders.
(b) Women’s decision to become a leader is not driven by individual honesty preferences.
(c) Subjects who applied for leadership increase dishonesty for groups.
The regressions emphasized that the endogenous choice to apply for leadership apparently
works as a sort of selection device for dishonest men. That is, they apply for leadership and
again behave dishonestly when deciding in the group domain. By contrast, we do not support
Hypothesis 3 for women.
When selection effects cannot explain women’s behavior, the question remains: Why do
women increase dishonesty when making decisions for groups? An explanation may be that
10Focusing on the control variables in Table 2, we find in model (2) that ambiguity preferences is positive and
significant. In model (4), we find that risk tolerance and the econ dummy are significant and positive.
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women’s honesty preferences could be context-dependent. More precisely, it is possible that
women do not behave dishonestly for themselves but start to behave dishonestly when deciding
for a group. Women’s increase in dishonesty could result from an interaction effect of the
deliberate decision to assume leadership and the payoff decision for the group. To disentangle
the effect of the active application of assuming leadership and a mere preference change due to
the context, we run a control treatment (exogenous leadership). This control treatment isolates
subjects’ active application as a leader from the pure responsibility of deciding on group payoffs.
4.3 The Impact of Exogenous Leadership
In the control treatment (exogenous leadership), subjects cannot apply for leadership. To isolate
the effects of the decision to assume leadership, we compare the findings of the main treatment
to the results in exogenous leadership. In this control treatment, we apply a similar sequence
of actions as before. The only difference is that this treatment disables the leadership choice
and leadership is exogenously determined by a random draw with varying probabilities (1/3
or 1/2). Before the analysis, we check whether dishonest behavior for groups depends on the
probability of becoming a leader. The data show that the probability (1/3 vs. 1/2) does
not significantly influence the fraction of dishonest reports in the groups (Fisher’s exact test,
p=0.323) and increased misreporting when deciding for groups (a dummy, which is positive
when subjects misreported for groups, but not for themselves) (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.439).11
We also run two Probit regressions which confirm the non-parametric test results and show that
the probability of becoming a leader has no effect (p>0.532).12 Thus, we merge these data.
Figure 3 presents the share of profitable dishonest behavior for individual payoffs and group
payoffs when leadership is exogenously determined.
Again, we find a gender difference in dishonest behavior when subjects decide for themselves.
That is, men behave significantly more often dishonestly (36%) than women (12%) (Fisher’s
exact test, p=0.003). Focusing on group payoffs, we find a moderate but insignificant increase for
men (from 36% to 46%) (Wilcoxon matched-pairs test, p=0.263). In contrast to the endogenous
treatment, women show a less pronounced and insignificant increase of dishonest behavior from
the individual (12%) to the group domain (18%) (Wilcoxon matched-pairs test, p=0.453). As a
consequence, the gender difference in dishonest behavior does not disappear for group decisions
in the treatment when leaders are exogenously determined (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.001).13
11In the endogenous treatment, we did a similar analysis and find that subjects’ beliefs of becoming a leader
do not significantly affect dishonest behavior for groups (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.463), or the dishonest behavior
for groups (p=0.223).
12In the two regressions, we included a dummy controlling for the two probabilities of ending up as a leader.
We also included a gender dummy and the same controls as in tables 1 and 2. When we exclude these controls,
the regressions yield similar results (the probability of becoming a leader has no effect: p>0.309).
13In the endogenous treatment, subjects stated the probability of ending up as a leader. A possible explanation
for the treatment effect could be that this probability distribution is significantly different from the communicated
probability distribution of becoming a leader in the exogenous treatment. However, we do not find a statistical
significant difference across treatments (Fisher’s exact test, p=0.206).
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Figure 3: Percentage of profitable dishonest reports in exogenous leadership. White (black) bars present
the reports for individual payoffs (group payoffs). Standard error bars included.
The finding that women do not increase dishonest behavior for groups without explicit
application for leadership demonstrates that their dishonest behavior is not purely context-
dependent. Probit regressions confirm this treatment difference in dishonest behavior for groups.
The regressions in Table 3 compare women’s increase in dishonest behavior in the endogenous
treatment and the exogenous treatment. For this, we apply subsample regressions. Models (1)–
(2) compare the increase in dishonest behavior of women who wanted to be leaders in endogenous
leadership with all women in the exogenous treatment. That is, the models focus on a dummy,
which becomes positive when subjects increased dishonest behavior in the group domain, as
compared to reporting for themselves Models (3)–(4) compare the increase in dishonest behavior
of women who opted against leadership in endogenous leadership with all women in the exogenous
treatment. In all models, we identify women in the exogenous treatment with a dummy variable
(exogenous leadership), which becomes positive in the exogenous treatment.
In models (2) and (4), we include the same control variables as in the previous regressions. We
also add a control variable that accounts for subjects’ beliefs (belief of becoming leader) that
they will end up as a leader in the two treatments. To compute the (perceived) probability
in the endogenous treatment, we used subjects’ guesses on how many other subjects want to
become a leader. In the exogenous treatment, the variable is the communicated probability of
ending up as a leader. All regressions report average marginal effects (see Table 7 in Appendix
A for the corresponding Probit model).
In models (1)–(2), the negative significant coefficient of exogenous leadership demonstrates
that women who could not apply for leadership increase dishonest behavior less often than
women who actively applied for leadership in the endogenous treatment. We do not find treat-
ment differences when we compare women who did not apply for leadership in the endogenous
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Table 3: Probit regressions on women’s increase in dishonesty for groups (endo. vs. exo).
increased dishonesty for groups
wanted leadership did not want leadership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
exogenous leadership -0.138** -0.147** -0.045 -0.049
(0.067) (0.064) (0.072) (0.078)
belief of becoming leader 0.178 0.058
(0.400) (0.301)
controlsa no yes no yes
Obs. 110 110 79 79
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The regressions report average marginal effects.
a Controls: Risk preferences, competition preferences, fairness, ambiguity
preferences, age, and whether subjects study economics.
treatment and women in the exogenous condition. That is, in model (3) exogenous leadership is
insignificant and model (4) shows that the results are robust to the inclusion of subjects’ beliefs
and controls.14 Thus, the treatment difference of leadership behavior is not driven by differences
in beliefs. We ran the same regression models for male subjects and find no significant treatment
effect in any of the four models (see Table 9 in Appendix A).
Result 3: Dishonest Behavior under Exogenous Leadership
(a) Under exogenous leadership, women behave less dishonestly for groups than men.
(b) Under exogenous leadership, women behave less dishonestly for groups than women who ac-
tively wanted to assume leadership in the endogenous treatment.
So far, the results show that selection effects cannot explain the increase in women’s mis-
reporting behavior for groups. Furthermore, we rule out that women’s honesty preferences are
solely context-dependent, i.e., whether they have to decide for individual or group payoffs. We
demonstrated that as soon as we disable the choice option to become a leader, women do not
behave more dishonestly in the group than in the individual domain. Hence, we conclude that
the treatment difference in the increase of dishonesty for groups is related to the leader-choice
option. More precisely, it is possible that the active choice to assume leadership interacts with
the decision to report the payoffs of a group. We speculate that the decision to assume leader-
ship may lead to a behavioral change for female leaders who then try to align their behavior to
14We find that risk tolerance is significantly positive, i.e., with increasing risk tolerance, women become more
likely to increase misreporting behavior for groups.
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the honesty preferences of their group members. In this respect, it is interesting to see whether
female leaders’ dishonest behavior coincides with their beliefs on group members’ honesty prefer-
ences. We conduct a follow-up experiment (study 2) to learn more about the behavioral change
in dishonest behavior and the hypothesized mechanisms on the role of women’s beliefs.
5 Study 2: Channels of Dishonest Behavior
In this section, we report the results of our follow-up study. In this study, we focus on the
endogenous treatment to get a better understanding of the interaction effect of women’s will-
ingness to assume leadership and their decisions when reporting group payoffs. We investigate
two potential channels. First, the active choice to decide on behalf of the group may activate
an increased sense of responsibility. Assuming responsibility for the group may heighten female
leaders’ focus on the other group members’ preferences. Thus, female leaders may try to behave
in line with the individual honesty preferences of other group members.
To examine this mechanism, we measure women’s beliefs on the reporting decision of a ran-
domly selected group member concerning his/her individual payoffs. Furthermore, we measure
women’s beliefs on the dishonest behavior of other group members when deciding on the group
payoffs. These beliefs may vary depending on the gender composition of the group. If female
leaders believe that men are more dishonest and these beliefs influence their dishonest behavior
in groups, they should behave more dishonestly in male groups. Therefore, we take the different
gender compositions of each group into account. Second, since the decisions of female leaders
impact the payoffs of other group members, womens’ social value orientation (SVO) may affect
the misreporting behavior for groups. Prosocial women in particular, in contrast to women who
are more concerned with their individual payoff, may increase dishonest behavior for the group.
Therefore, we elicit subjects’ SVO. We also conduct a post-experimental questionnaire to learn
more about subjects’ motives for behaving dishonestly for the group.
5.1 Study 2: Experimental Design
The experiment is almost identical to the first study.15 It comprises seven parts and one of them
is randomly determined to be payoff-relevant. In the first block of the experiment, we measure
subjects’ preferences. That is, we elicit risk preferences with the method of Eckel and Grossman
(2002) and social value orientation with the ring measure of Liebrand and McClintock (1988).
Here, subjects are repeatedly confronted with two possible payoff allocations between themselves
and another subject. In each decision set, the allocations vary in payoff differences. Subjects have
15The second study is not a replication study. Instead, we aim to dig deeper into the mechanisms of women’s
behavior change under endogenous leadership. For this, we elicit leaders’ beliefs on the dishonest behavior of the
group members social value orientation (SVO). Since we had time constraints in the experiment, we had to drop
the elicitation of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) parameters and ambiguity attitudes since the study would have
become too long.
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to decide for one payoff allocation and trade off between more money for themselves and more
equal/more money in total for both. Based on their choices, one can calculate an angle value
for each subject (see Appendix B for details). Afterward, we measure competitive preferences
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Next, we measure individual honesty preferences.
In a next part, we measure dishonest behavior for groups. Here, a slight difference occurs
and we intentionally vary the groups’ gender compositions. We create groups with three women,
a woman and two men, and with two women and one man. We use a special algorithm that aims
to generate mainly these compositions. With excessive men in the session, the algorithm forms
groups consisting only of men. In this part, everything is equal to the previous experiment.
However, additionally, we inform subjects on the gender, age, and semester number of the other
subjects.16 Subjects receive this information after making their leader-choice decisions and
before making their group reporting decision. We apply this timing to rule out that the decision
to become a leader is affected by the information on the gender composition in the group.
Next, we elicit subjects’ beliefs on dishonesty in groups, i.e., their beliefs about the reporting
decision for the case when other group members reported the payoffs of the group. Therefore,
subjects learn that the computer randomly rolls a die for the whole group. After subjects see
the die-roll, they make their reporting decision. Thereafter, we elicit their beliefs on other group
members’ reporting decisions. For this, we again show the subjects some information (gender,
age, and semester number) on the other two group members. They have to guess which number
each of the two group members reported. Subjects receive e1 for each correct guess, reducing
the likelihood of motivated beliefs.
In a next step, we elicit women’s beliefs on individual dishonesty, i.e., their belief about
other group members’ individual reporting decisions. To measure this, we ask subjects about
the reporting decision of a randomly selected group member. For this, we show them the
information of the selected group member. Then, subjects have to state the reported number
for each possible die number between one and six.17 Finally, we ask subjects questions on their
motives for becoming/or not becoming a leader. We also ask them about the motives for the
report they made. The study design of study 2 is illustrated in Figure 4. We highlighted the
changes in black whereas the initial study design is illustrated in gray.
In the follow-up study 219 subjects (90 male; 129 female) participated. We only invited
subjects who did not participate in study one. On average, the sessions lasted 70 minutes and
subjects earned e12.64.
16We elicit this information at the very beginning of the experiment. Here, subjects are told that it is possible
that this information may be communicated to other subjects in the course of the experiment. We do not present
this information in the male-only treatment since we intended to use this treatment as control data.
17We apply the strategy method to elicit their beliefs. Subjects are told that the computer checks for the real
die number, which was shown to the matched person in part six. The computer refers to their belief for this
number and checks whether it coincides with the reported number. If their belief was correct they earned e1.
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Figure 4: Experimental sequence of study two; in black the additional elements to study 1
5.2 Study 2: Results
The aggregate data of study two confirm our previous findings of the first study. Women
significantly increase dishonest behavior from 12% to 23% when deciding on the group payoffs
(Wilcoxon matched-pairs test, p=0.004). Turning to men, we find that the increase is less
pronounced (from 13% to 21%) and fails significance (Wilcoxon matched-pairs test, p=0.108).
In further analyses, we focus on women’s decisions since the purpose of study two is to learn
more about women’s behavioral change when they assume leadership.
To start with, we analyze the impact of group compositions on reporting decisions. We find
that female leaders’ dishonest behavior does not differ between all possible group compositions
(only women, one men, two men) (Fisher’s exact test on joint data, p=0.531). The same holds
when focusing on women’s increase of dishonest behavior for groups (Fisher’s exact test on joint
data, p=0.755). Thus, we merge these data for further analyses.
5.2.1 The Impact of Beliefs and Social-Value Orientation
In this section, we explore whether women’s reporting decisions for the group are influenced by
their beliefs about the individual honesty preferences of other group members. We start this
analysis by focusing on the effects of the leadership choice on dishonest behavior. The data
support our previous findings, i.e., women who apply for leadership behave significantly more
dishonestly (24%) in the group compared to the individual domain (11%) (Wilcoxon matched-
pairs test, p=0.005).18
Next, we turn to the first potential channel of the increased misreporting in groups. We
focus on women’s belief on individual dishonesty, i.e., their belief about other group members’
individual reporting decisions. We use the measure of individual honesty preferences since it
may be more informative as beliefs on dishonesty in groups may also reflect the decision-makers’
beliefs about other group members’ social preferences. We find that subjects’ belief that group
members misreport, i.e., the average belief is higher than the real die number. The only exception
is die number five with an average belief of 4.46, which is slightly below five. Based on the beliefs
for all possible die numbers, we calculate the mean-belief as an aggregate measure of the believed
(dis-)honesty of the other group members.
18Focusing on men who wanted to become a leader, we also support the previous findings. That is, the impact
of endogenous leadership is less pronounced, i.e., men show an insignificant increase of dishonest behavior from
13% to 22% (Wilcoxon matched-pairs test, p=0.180).
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Figure 5 overviews women’s increase in dishonest behavior between the individual and the
group domain.
Figure 5: Women’s increase in dishonesty when deciding on group payoffs, conditional on leader choice
and on their belief on individual dishonesty. Standard error bars included.
It distinguishes between women who wanted to become a leader (left panel) or not (right
panel). The figure also differentiates on women’s belief on individual dishonesty and presents
the effects conditional on the median split (3.0). We distinguish between a below/equal-median
belief (white bars) and an above-median belief (black bars).
The diagram shows that women who wanted to assume leadership align their dishonest
behavior for groups based on their belief of individual dishonesty. When these women have an
above-median belief on the individual misreporting behavior of the other group members, they
show a substantially higher increase (30%) in dishonesty, as compared to women who hold a
low belief (2%) (Fisher’s exact test, p<0.001). Turning to women who did not want to assume
leadership, we do not find such a pattern. In this case, misreporting behavior is independent of
the beliefs and women who hold a below-median belief show a similar increase (18%) in dishonest
behavior to women who hold an above-median belief (17%) (Fisher’s exact test, p=1.000).
Regarding our second channel of the increased misreporting in groups, we apply Probit
regression analyses, controlling for the impact of social value orientation. In model (1), we use
the full sample of female decisions, unconditional on the willingness to assume leadership. Model
(2) focuses on the subsample of women who wanted to assume leadership whereas model (3)
concentrates on the subsample of women who did not want to assume leadership.
We always control for women’s belief on individual dishonesty. The models also include svo,
which is the angle value of subjects’ social value orientation. In models (2) and (3), we also in-
clude control variables, i.e., subjects’ risk preferences, competition preferences, age, and whether
they study economics. All models are clustered on subjects’ matching groups of the commu-
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Table 4: Probit regressions on the increase in dishonesty of women conditional on their leadership pref-
erences.
increase in dishonest behavior
all data wanted leadership did not want leadership
(1) (2) (3)
belief on individual dishonesty 0.107*** 0.140*** 0.027
(0.028) (0.028) (0.071)
svo 0.001** 0.001 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
controlsa no yes yes
Obs. 129 78 42
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The regressions are clustered at the group level and report average marginal effects.
a Controls: risk preferences, age, and whether subjects study economics.
nicated demographics of group members. The regressions report average marginal effects (see
Table 10 in Appendix A for the corresponding Probit model).19
The regressions confirm the findings of Figure 3. That is, in model (1), the highly significant
positive coefficient of belief on individual dishonesty demonstrates that the likelihood of dishonest
behavior significantly increases in women’s beliefs on group members’ individual misreporting
behavior. One may argue that this relation could be a consequence of “motivated beliefs.”
However, we do not believe that this should affect results, as we incentivized the belief elicitation.
Thus, stating motivated beliefs would result in lower payoffs.
Moreover, the regression highlights that svo is significant and positive, which is in line with
the idea that prosocial female leaders behave dishonestly to support group members. Model
(2) emphasizes that the effect of women’s belief on dishonesty is only relevant for women who
wanted to assume leadership. We find that the coefficient of belief on individual dishonesty
is positive and highly significant, whereas it becomes insignificant as soon as we concentrate
on women who did not want to assume leadership (model (3)). Turning to svo, we find that
prosociality is of importance for women who did not want to assume leadership. Here, more
prosocial women are more likely to increase dishonesty for groups. Robustness checks show that
the regression results hold when we apply women’s beliefs on dishonesty in groups instead of the
beliefs on individual dishonesty (see Table 11 in Appendix A).
Result 4: Beliefs on Individual Dishonesty and Dishonesty in Groups
(a) Women who want to assume leadership misreport significantly more for groups when they
believe that group members have preferences for dishonesty.
19The sample size becomes smaller when we include control variables (models (1)–(2)). Due to a technical
problem in the experiment we lost data on the risk preferences for nine subjects.
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(b) Women who did not want to assume leadership misreport significantly more for groups with
increasing social value orientation (svo).
5.2.2 Questionnaire
In the questionnaire, we asked for the reasons to apply for leadership and to report specific
payoffs. Subjects answered in free-form texts. We classified women’s answers based on certain
dimensions: (i) importance of active role in group decision; (ii) acting as a leader is more
interesting; (iii) enforcement of individual honesty preferences; (iv) assuming responsibility for
the group. Among women who applied for leadership, we find two large groups, which we
report henceforth. First, 30.9% state that they wanted to have an active role, where they could
influence the reporting decision. Second, 29.8% argue that they wanted to become leaders to
assume responsibility for the group. A closer look shows that this share increases to 45% when
focusing on women with a high belief in individual dishonesty. Moreover, 56% of them misreport
for the group.
This pattern is supported when we focus on women’s reasons for their reporting behavior.
Women who have a high belief in individual dishonesty state in 23% of cases that they misre-
ported to achieve a high payoff for group members. In contrast, for female leaders with a low
belief in individual dishonesty, we find that this share is significantly smaller (4.4%) (Fisher’s
exact test, p=0.022). Hence, the questionnaire supports the idea that women who applied for
leadership are shaped by a norm to fulfill the needs of group members.
Finally, when we focus on women who did not want to become leaders, we find that the
majority (67.5%) argue that they do not want to assume responsibility for the group.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed in two studies gender differences in leadership decisions and dishon-
est behavior for groups. In the first study, we focused on a within-subjects experiment with
two stages, where subjects first decide for themselves and subsequently report payoffs for their
groups. Moreover, we model subjects’ deliberate decision to apply for leadership. We can an-
alyze whether this decision is related to individual honesty preferences and whether it impacts
reporting behavior in a group context. Our second study focused on the mechanisms of women’s
dishonest behavior in the group domain.
Study one demonstrates that men behave more dishonestly than women in the individual
domain, corroborating the predominant evidence. A novel finding of this study is that women
alter their behavior when they act as leaders and wanted to assume leadership whereas men act
similarly in the individual and in the group domain. A closer look at the leader-choice option
reveals that men’s decision to become a leader is shaped by their individual honesty preferences.
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By contrast, although women behave more dishonestly for groups, we do not find that their
decision to apply for leadership is linked to their honesty preferences. Our control treatment
disables the leader-choice option and highlights that, in this case, women’s decision to behave
dishonestly is not context-dependent, i.e., does not differ across the individual and the group
context. The control treatment highlights that women do not increase dishonesty when they
take up leadership positions per se. Our results suggest that women’s explicit decision to assume
responsibility for a group leads to a behavioral change.
The results of study two disclose a potential channel for female leaders’ increase of dishonesty.
That is, the explicit decision to become a leader motivates them to adjust their behavior to the
honesty preferences of group members. This phenomenon does not depend on the group context
per se. It occurs as a combination of the decision to become a leader who subsequently has to
report payoffs for a group. We find that social value orientation only matters for women who
did not want to assume leadership. That is, prosocial leaders are more likely to misreport when
deciding for groups.
Our paper improves the understanding of women’s and men’s motivation to apply for lead-
ership. We also shed light on gender differences in dishonest behavior when deciding for groups.
We showed that women’s decision to apply for leadership is not correlated to their honesty
preferences. This highlights that the gender gap in the application to leadership positions may
not be associated with women’s less pronounced preference for dishonesty. This may imply that
there is no need to address differing honesty preferences of men and women in workplace policies.
Interestingly, we show that although women may not behave dishonestly for themselves, actively
assuming responsibility motivates them to behave dishonestly for others. This highlights the im-
portance of promotion mechanisms, as our results demonstrate that the opportunity to apply for
leadership may lead to a behavioral change for women who decide for a group. This insight may
imply that leadership demands that women implicitly change their preferences due to others’
expectations. This may have a range of consequences. For instance, it suggests that affirmative
action policies in the form of women’s quota may not per se result in higher ethical standards
at the management level. Moreover, if female executives have to adapt a leadership style that is
not in line with individual preferences results in higher perceived mental stress (Gardiner and
Tiggemann, 1999). It could result in women giving up the leadership position in the long term
to reduce this mental stress. There is scarce experimental evidence on how employee’s individual
behavior changes when their role transforms from employee to leader. Our study is novel in this
regard, observing individual changes in dishonesty behavior, and may spur further research in
the future.
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Appendix A - Tables
Table 5: Random effects Probit regressions on dishonest behavior in endogenous leadership.
dishonest behavior
(1) (2) (3)
female -0.747** -1.529*** -1.009**
(0.303) (0.502) (0.459)
group payoff 0.674*** 0.265 0.261
(0.039) (0.280) (0.279)
female × group payoff 1.160** 1.104**
(0.503) (0.488)
constant -1.179*** -1.000*** -8.019
(0.273) (0.290) (65.793)
controlsa no no yes
obs. 288 288 288
groups 144 144 144
Wald Chi2 13.00 13.35 20.40
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The regressions are clustered on the subject level (n =
144).
a Controls: Risk preferences, competition preferences, fair-
ness, ambiguity preferences, age, whether subjects study eco-
nomics, and an order dummy.
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Table 6: Probit regressions on wanted leadership and dishonesty for groups (endog. leadership).
wanted leadership dishonesty for groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
female -0.185 -0.167 -0.189 0.163
(0.238) (0.269) (0.227) (0.265)
wanted leadership 0.607** 0.630**
(0.290) (0.305)
misreported for themselves 0.684* 1.153**
(0.405) (0.574)
female × misreported for themselves -0.306
(0.266)
constant 0.696*** -0.581 -0.973*** -2.484
(0.187) (49.006) (0.292) (54.782)
controlsa no yes no yes
obs. 144 144 144 144
pseudo R2 0.030 0.098 0.034 0.116
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Controls: Risk preferences, competition preferences, fairness, ambiguity
preferences, age, whether subjects study economics, and an order dummy.
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Table 7: Probit regressions on women’s increase in dishonesty for groups (endo. vs. exo).
increased dishonesty for groups
wanted leadership did not want leadership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
exogenous leadership -0.604** -0.778** -0.258 -0.311
(0.303) (0.348) (0.409) (0.494)
belief of becoming leader 0.939 0.365
(2.117) (1.905)
constant -0.751 -120.444 -1.097 -57.755
(0.191) (116.842) (0.335) (120.115)
controlsa no yes no yes
obs. 110 110 79 79
pseudo R2 0.044 0.199 0.008 0.114
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Controls: Risk preferences, competition preferences, fairness, ambiguity
preferences, age, and whether subjects study economics.
Table 8: Probit regressions on men’s increase in dishonesty for groups (endo. vs. exo) Marginal effects
reported.
increased dishonesty for groups
wanted leadership did not want leadership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
exogenous leadership 0.050 0.048 0.076 0.131
(0.073) (0.072) (0.125) (0.130)
belief of becoming leader 0.229 0.511
(0.335) (0.456)
controlsa no yes no yes
obs. 116 116 75 75
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The regressions report average marginal effects.
a Controls: Risk preferences, competition preferences, fairness, ambiguity
preferences, age, and whether subjects study economics.
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Table 9: Probit regressions on men’s increase in dishonesty for groups (endo. vs. exo).
increased dishonesty for groups
wanted leadership did not want leadership
(1) (2) (3) (4)
exogenous leadership 0.184 0.193 0.272 0.495
(0.271) (0.293) (0.452) (0.497)
belief of becoming leader 0.923 1.932
(1.361) (1.762)
constant -0.980*** 35.478 -1.068** 21.438
(0.202) (60.240) (0.414) (69.404)
controlsa no yes no yes
obs. 116 116 75 75
pseudo R2 0.004 0.079 0.005 0.051
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Controls: Risk preferences, competition preferences, fairness, ambiguity
preferences, age, and whether subjects study economics.
Table 10: Probit regressions on the increase in dishonesty of women conditional on their leadership
preferences. Marginal effects reported.
increase in dishonest behavior
all data wanted leadership did not want leadership
(1) (2) (3)
belief on individual dishonesty 0.510*** 0.816*** 0.124
(0.147) (0.168) (0.341)
svo 0.006** 0.006 0.004**
(0.003) (0.007) (0.002)
constant -2.982*** 68.545 -116.162
(0.591) (94.553) (218.99)
controlsa no yes yes
obs. 129 78 42
pseudo R2 0.146 0.302 0.200
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Controls: risk preferences, age, and whether subjects study economics.
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Table 11: Probit regressions on the increase in dishonesty of women conditional on their leadership
preferences.
increase in dishonest behavior
all data wanted leadership did not want leadership
(1) (2) (3)
belief on dishonesty in groups 0.227*** 0.218*** 0.333***
(0.061) (0.072) (0.095)
svo 0.001* 0.001 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
controlsa no yes yes
obs. 129 78 42
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The regressions report average marginal effects.
a Controls: risk preferences, age, and whether subjects study economics.
Table 12: Probit regressions on the increase in dishonesty of women conditional on their leadership
preferences.
increase in dishonest behavior
all data wanted leadership did not want leadership
(1) (2) (3)
belief on dishonesty in groups 1.061*** 1.013*** 1.997***
(0.313) (0.367) (0.721)
svo 0.005* 0.003 0.014**
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
constant -1,622*** 85.266 130.383
(0.270) (85.094) 240.020
controlsa no yes yes
obs. 129 78 42
pseudo R2 0.134 0.145 0.382
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
a Controls: risk preferences, age, and whether subjects study economics.
31
Appendix B - Preference elicitations (Study 1)
part one - elicitation of risk preferences
In the risk elicitation task of Eckel and Grossman (2002), subjects had to choose one out of six lotteries.
With a 50% probability each lottery leads to a low or a high payoff. Subjects’ lottery choice can be
interpreted as a measure of her degree of risk aversion, i.e., higher lottery numbers reflect riskier lotteries
Choice Low Payoff (e) High Payoff (e) Exp. payoff Implied CRRA Range
1 5.60 5.60 5.60 3.46<r
2 7.20 4.80 6.00 1.16<r<3.45
3 8.80 4.00 6.40 0.71<r<1.16
4 10.40 3.20 6.80 0.50<r<0.71
5 12.00 2.40 7.20 0.00<r<0.50
6 14.00 0.40 7.20 r<0
Table 13: Overview of the lottery choices in part 1. Risk is measured as standard deviation of expected
payoff.
part two - elicitation of advantageous inequality aversion
In part two, the modified dictator game (MDG) of (Blanco et al., 2011) was used to measure subjects’
aversion to advantageous inequality (β in Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). In the MDG, participants are
presented to a list with 22 pairs of payoff vectors. They choose one of the two payoff vectors for all 22
pairs. Both vectors represent a money split between the dictator and the recipient. The left vector is
constant and always (20, 0). If the participants choose it, they receive e19 and the recipients earn e1.
All vectors on the right-hand side are increasing equal-money splits: from (1, 1) to (21, 21).20 The task
aims to find out when subjects switch from (20, 0) to the equal split. The table contains 22 buttons,
located above all decisions between an unequal and an equal split. Subjects know that clicking on a
button has the effect that all equal splits below the button are marked for selection and all unequal splits
above the button are also marked for selection. If a subject prefers all equal splits from (3, 3) to (20, 20)
over the unequal split, she should click on the third button. Whereas, if a subject only prefers all equal
splits starting from (9, 9) she should click on button 9. The earlier a subject switches to the equal split,
the more pronounced her aversion is to advantageous inequality.
part three - elicitation of disadvantageous inequality aversion
In part three we measured subjects’ aversion to disadvantageous inequality (α in Fehr and Schmidt,
1999) using the method of Blanco et al. (2011). In an ultimatum game using the strategy method
(Selten, 1967) participants decide in the role of proposers and recipients. They know that after the
experiment is finished, the computer will randomly pair two players and determine their role (proposer
or recipient) and the payoff-relevant decision. At the beginning, all subjects decide as proposers. They
have to decide how much of e20 they are willing to propose to the recipient. afterward, all subjects
decide in the role of recipients. In this respect, they indicate which minimum proposer offer they would
accept. Subjects are given a table with 22 rows of different proposals for each possible integer allocation
20Extending the right vectors to (21, 21) allows us to account for negative β’s (Blanco et al., 2011).
32
of the e20 between the two players. They have to indicate whether they would reject or accept each
individual proposal. Therefore, all proposals have to be marked for rejection or acceptance. The goal is
to find out, when subjects switch from rejecting an offer to accepting it. Therefore, the table contains 22
buttons which are located above each proposal. Subjects are told that clicking on a button would mean
that all proposals below the button would be marked for acceptance, whereas all proposals above the
button would be marked for rejection. For instance, if a subject wants to accept all proposals between
0 and 20, she has to click on the first button. If she wants to accept all proposals starting from e4, she
would click on button 4. The higher the minimum accepted offer is, the higher a subject’s aversion to
disadvantageous inequality.
part four, five, and six - elicitation of competitive preferences
In parts four to six subjects participate in the mathematical real-effort task introduced by Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007). Here, subjects have to add up five two-digit numbers. An example of the real-effort
task (a math problem to be solved) is presented in Table 14. Subjects have to enter the answer in the
blank box. Having submitting an answer, subjects are presented with the next problem without being
informed of whether the answer was correct or not.
75 33 12 19 25
Table 14: Example of a problem in the real-effort task
In part four subjects work for five minutes in the real-effort task. We follow Niederle and Vesterlund
(2007) and pay subjects a piece rate of e0.50 for each correctly solved problem. In part five subjects are
matched in groups of four and participate in a tournament. They again spend five minutes completing
the real-effort task. Here, their individual payments depend on their own performance compared to the
performance of the three other participants in their group. If a subject achieves the best performance
in the group, she receives e2 for each correct answer. However, if a subject does not achieve the best
performance, she earns nothing. We measure subjects competitiveness preferences in part four, as their
willingness to participate in a tournament. Therefore, subjects have to decide whether they want to
participate in a tournament against three other participants, or whether they want to work under a piece
rate. After subjects make their choices, they were given another five minutes to compete the real-effort
task. If subjects work under the tournament, their performance is compared to the performance of the
other three members of the group they are assigned to in part five (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007).
part seven - elicitation of ambiguity attitudes
In this part subjects can earn Talers. We apply an exchange rate of 1 Taler = e0.05. To elicit individual
ambiguity preferences, subjects decide in a multiple price list (MPL) design by Gneezy et al. (2015)
with 20 rows. Each row involves a choice between a risky gamble in the left column (Option A) and
an ambiguous gamble in the right column (Option B). Subjects are told that the payoffs of the options
depend on the color which is drawn out of two urns that are filled with a certain number of red and
black balls. They know that the risky urn (Option A) is exactly composed with 50 red and black balls.
Whereas, they know that the composition of the ambiguous urn (Option B) is unknown. Before subjects
are presented the choice list, they have to bet on a color (red or black). They are told that they receive
the high payoff if this color will be drawn in the urn draw. After subjects make their bet, they have to
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decide for all 20 rows of the MPL, whether they prefer the risky lottery (Option A) or the ambiguous
lottery (Option B). The possible payoff of Option A is constant for all 20 rows, i.e., when choosing
Option A subjects always can win 200 Taler with a probability of 50%. Whereas, the payoff of Option
B is increasing when subjects go down by one row. It starts from 164 Talers (row 1) and ends at 316
Talers (row 20). Subjects receive these payoffs with a subjective probability of 50%21 The switch point
determines subjects’ ambiguity attitude. That is, subjects who switch early (late) from Option A to
Option B are characterized by a lower (higher) degree of ambiguity preferences. Subjects know that if
part five would become payoff relevant, a random draw would select one of the 20 rows. Subjects’ choice
in this row would be selected to be payoff relevant. If subjects have selected Option A, they are playing
a random draw with a probability of 50%. If however, Option B was selected, then subjects play the
corresponding lottery. The composition of the ambiguous urn is randomly determined by a computer.
Appendix B - Preference elicitations (Study 2)
[The elicitation of risk preferences and competitive preferences was similar as in study 1.]
part two - elicitation of social value orientation
We elicit social value orientation with the ring measure of Liebrand and McClintock (1988). In this
part subject are randomly matched with another participant and are subsequently presented to 32 pairs
(“opportunity A” and “opportunity B”) of allocation decisions between themselves and the matched
person. In each of the 32 decision situations, subjects either have to choose opportunity A or B. In these
cases subjects decide about points, which will be converted at an exchange rate of 1 point = e0.02, if
the part becomes payoff relevant. For each pair, subjects have to trade off allocations, which differ in the
degree of disadvantageous/advantageous inequality between the subject and the matched subject. At the
same time, subjects are also matched with a different subject, who also allocates points to herself and the
matched subject. Subjects know that if part two will become payoff relevant, they will earn the sum of
the point, that they allocated to themselves plus the points, which were allocated to them by the second
matching partner. If the part becomes payoff relevant, subjects are also informed on the total amount of
points they received. Using subject’s mean allocations for self and for the matched participant, shifting
the base of the resulting angle to the center and taking the ratio between these means one can estimate
the subject’s motivational vector. This gives us the social value orientation angle of the subjects.
21Recall, that subjects bet on one of two colors.
34
